Development of a Church and Civil Society Forum Conflict Early Warning Mechanism

July 2012

Development of a Church and Civil Society Forum Conflict Early Warning Mechanism

Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF)
July 2012

List of acronyms

AIPPA	Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act
CCSF	Church and Civil Society Forum
CEWS	Continental Early Warning System
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EC	European Commission
EWS	Early Warning Systems
GNU	Government of National Unity
GPA	Global Political Agreement
JOMIC	Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MMCZ	Minerals Marketing Cooperation of Zimbabwe
NANGO	National Association of NGOs
NGO	Non Government Organization
NPRC	National Peace and Reconciliation Council
NSAs	Non State Actors
ONHRI	Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration
POSA	Public Order and Security Act
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VAT	Value Added Tax
WB	Word Bank
ZANU PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZEC	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission
ZESN	Zimbabwe Election Support Network
ZPP	Zimbabwe Peace Project
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

Contents

Executive Summary

Violence, which appears to be deeply entrenched in the political culture of Zimbabwe, has become a major concern to citizens, neighbours, regional and international community. It is worrying that all recent elections have been marred with violence, which in some cases claimed hundreds of lives.

In order to play their part in addressing the problem of violence and its impact on communities, churches and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe came together to develop a framework on National Healing, Reconciliation, Integration and Prevention of Violence. The result was the formation of the Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF).

The CCSF recognizes the potential value addition of an Early Warning System (EWS) in so far as it can help promote early responses to prevent occurrence or escalation of conflict. In this regard, the CCSF is considering establishing a Violence Early Warning System. Before establishing the proposed EWS, the CCSF decided to undertake a background study to review existing literature, draw lessons from other countries and regions on EWSs and to capture members' and stakeholders' expectations on the relevance, form, character and expected value addition of a CCSF Violence EWS.

This study was qualitative. It employed primary and secondary data collection methods.

Findings:

- Although violence is a national phenomenon, it is concentrated in specific areas. In this regard, some generalizations can be made based on analysis of trends. For example, violence has generally been high in swing constituencies, political party strongholds and highly populated residential and peri-urban settlements where there is a large number of unemployed youths.
- There are a number of initiatives by Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, United Nations Development Programme, Churches and Civil Society in Zimbabwe aimed at peace-building and prevention of violence. The efficacy and impact of was not a subject of this study.
- Politically motivated violence has assumed an upward trend as the talk of holding elections this year or early next year gathers momentum. This is in spite of utterances by political leaders to stop violence.
- The principle of an EWS is widely accepted by CCSF members and civil society

in general. The main challenge is for the CCSF as a whole to engage in honest discussions at a political level to allay any potential fears that individual members may have and to address any identified risks that may arise from the establishment of the EWS and to mobilize sufficient resources for its operations.

Recommendations

- There is urgent need for political commitment and endorsement by the leadership of CCSF of the principle of a coordinated Violence EWS and what that practically means.

- The CCSF is presented with mainly two models regarding the institutional architecture of the Violence EWS, from which a hybrid can be chosen also. These are:1) Centralised EWS (With a Central Hub/Situation Room), whose location should be based on an agreed criteria and 2) A decentralized but linked framework based on existing civil society structures. Whichever model chosen by the CCSF, it must ensure connections with the grassroots whilst at the same time ensuring human security, objectivity, sustainability and value addition.

- Should the CCSF opt for a centralized EWS, which is the model used under normal circumstances, it should consider recruiting at least two people for the effective functioning of the EWS namely Analyst and Communication officer.

- As soon as the institutional framework is agreed upon the CCSF members should adopt the indicators, data collection, analysis methods as well as reporting frameworks. This may imply a rapid audit of and consolidation of existing tools and methodologies whilst at the same time strengthening identified gaps.

- The proposed CCSF Violence EWS should work with and specifically seek to trigger early responses by existing institutions including but not limited to JOMIC, Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, Government of National Unity, Regional and International Community.

- The Management Committee of CCSF should manage any potential crises of expectations regarding the overall purpose and institutional architecture of the CCSF Violence Early Warning as well as issues of access to and utilization of resources for this purpose.

- Upon establishment of the EWS, CCSF must develop and implement a risk and security management plan.

- Civil society can contribute to prevention of violence through community

based peace building and conflict transformation programmes; continuous advocacy for the regional and international community to continuously monitor the political situation and to impress upon parties to the Global Political Agreement to fully implement its provisions and complementing efforts by JOMIC and the Organ on National Healing.

Chapter 1

Background and research methodology

Introduction

Zimbabwe's political history, especially after 2000, has been marred with controversy and contestation as well as cyclic and systemic politically motivated violence (Sachikonye, 2011, EISA, 2010). Electoral contestation, particularly after the disputed 2002 presidential elections, degenerated into a national economic, humanitarian and political crisis. Electoral violence for example, reached an all-time high during the 2008 presidential runoff. Cases of arson, murder, rape, disappearances, intimidations, raids on civil society and several other forms of violence were recorded in many parts of the country.

As a result of the unprecedented violence that characterized the June 2008 presidential runoff elections, the Africa Union had to mandate SADC to facilitate negotiations amongst contending political parties with the aim of forming an inclusive government. ZANU PF and the two MDC formations, after months of negotiations, signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008 and established the Government of National Unity in February 2009.

Today, a number of stakeholders, including churches and civil society continue to grapple with the question of where they were when the violence of the 2008 magnitude erupted and whether something could have been done to prevent it.

Levels of politically motivated violence decreased after the signing of the Global Political Agreement in September 2008. It is regrettable that in the recent months, there is an upward trend in incidences of politically motivated violence triggered first by the contested constitutional reform process and secondly by the announcement of the imminence of elections.

Church and Civil Society Forum

In order to play their part in addressing the problem of politically motivated violence and its impact on communities, churches and civil society organizations came together to develop a framework on National Healing, Reconciliation, Integration and Prevention of Violence in Zimbabwe. The imperative to work together resulted

in the formation of the Church and Civil Society Forum (CCSF). CCSF draws its membership from civil society organizations and all the main apex organizations of key Christian denominations namely: Catholics, traditional or mainline churches and evangelicals operating in different parts of the country. CCSF currently has 25 members. It is housed by the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO). The specific objectives of the CCSF are:-

- To develop national and local mechanisms for violence prevention to promote community cohesion.
- To strengthen the capacity of the church, civil society and policy makers to engage on issues of reconciliation and violence prevention.
- To create awareness and encourage participation of communities in all aspects of reconciliation, integration and violence prevention.
- To create more efficient reconciliation and violence prevention processes by coordinating and bundling existing programs, including bringing thematically-related organizations together, avoiding the duplication of processes, and en-suring that programs are evenly distributed in the country[1].

CCSF does not seek to re-invent the wheel in its endeavour to achieve its objectives. Instead it seeks to exploit the diversity and complementarities of churches and civil society organizations as a collective in addressing issues of violence in Zimbabwe.

Case for an Early Warning System

The CCSF recognizes the potential value addition of an Early Warning System (EWS) in so far as it can help promote early responses to prevent occurrence or escalation of conflict. It however remains mindful of the fact that it is one thing to generate early warning information and it is another, if not an uphill task, to trigger early responses to prevent violence.

The notion of EWSs is rooted in the conviction that conflicts are preventable (Ateya and Wisler, 2007). The duo further contends that any conflict can be an-nounced early by a multitude of converging signals. The mechanism through which these signs can be picked, analysed and interpreted is now what is widely regarded as an Early Warning System (EWS).

Cilliers (2005), Ateya and Wisler (2007) have argued that through the study of some specific events, behaviour of certain individuals, incidents or public declara-tions, and their sedimentation in specific patterns state and non-state actors are able to announce the imminence of a major political seism or violent conflict. These

---

[1] *Concept Paper / Summary of Action for the CCSF*

signs can only be picked through the systematic collection of conflict-relevant data, analysis of this data and transfer of analytical insights into practice.

The case for EWSs has already been made on African soil. The African Union and nearly all of its Regional Economic Communities have established or are in the process of establishing EWSs. Conflict tone areas like the Horn of Africa, Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and many individual states have established their own EWSs. The efficacy and actual impact of these initiatives is however still a subject of debate. Suffice to say that regardless of scope, reach and impact, these different EWSs provide lessons and pointers to CCSF on the institutional and technical architecture of an effective EWS.

The logic of EWSs lies in early responses to prevent conflict arising from the early warning information. Without early actions, EWSs become mere academic exercises with no immediate practical value.

Purpose of the study

Before establishing the proposed EWS, the CCSF decided to undertake a background study to review existing literature, draw lessons from existing EWSs and to capture members' and stakeholders' expectations on the relevance, form, character and expected value addition of a CCSF Violence EWS.
The background study entailed the following:-

An empirical profiling of the nature and character of violence in Zimbabwe in order to inform the institutional, technical and functioning of the proposed EWS.

A rapid appraisal of the current responses (by both state and non-state actors) to violence, in order to ascertain gaps, opportunities and draw lessons for the proposed CCSF Violence EWS.

An analysis of early signs for the recurrence of violence in the face of forthcoming elections in Zimbabwe.

Conceptual and discursive analysis – also informed by CCSF members' views - of the likely architecture and workability of a violence early warning system in Zimbabwe.

Distillation of key recommendations and concrete proposals on how the CCSF can implement the proposed CCSF Violence Early Warning Mechanism.

Research methodology

The study was qualitative. It employed primary and secondary data collection methods. An Inception meeting was held with the Editorial Committee of CCSF to discuss the methodology and approach to the research. The actual research started with literature review to explore the key concepts and perspectives regarding the history, nature and character of violence in Zimbabwe and Early Warning Systems (EWS) in general.

A wide range of reports, press statements and position papers of civil society in Zimbabwe (churches, trade unions and NGOs) were reviewed in great detail in order to deeply understand the drivers and manifestations of violence and to get pointers on how the EWS can possibly look like. In addition, focus group discussions were held in Bulawayo, Midlands, Masvingo, Mutare and Harare. A total of 42 civil society representatives participated in these focus group discussions. A semi-structured questionnaire was also circulated to all 25 members of CCSF. 13 members (52%) completed the questionnaire. In-depth interviews were conducted with 4 other members. Therefore 68% of CCSF members directly participated in the study either through filling in the questionnaire, in-depth interview or focus group discussions. In addition to CCSF members 6 other civil society organizations also completed the questionnaire.

The draft report was presented to all members of the CCSF during its Bi-Annual Conference held in Bulawayo on the 27th to the 28th of June 2012. Comments and contributions from members were considered in the final draft.

The researchers unsuccessfully tried to contact political parties and officials from the Government of Zimbabwe. The perspectives in this report are therefore drawn from literature review, churches and civil society organizations in Zimbabwe.

Recognizing that the political environment in Zimbabwe is charged and paranoid data was collected with utmost confidentiality and on the basis of non-attribution.

Structure of the report

The report has six chapters. The first chapter provides a background and objectives of the study. The second chapter sets the context for the Early Warning System by discussing the nature and character of violence in Zimbabwe. The third chapter analyses current responses to violence in order to identify gaps and opportunities for the CCSF Violence EWS. The fourth chapter outlines some of the early signs of recurrence of violence in Zimbabwe. Chapter five discusses in detail the

conceptual framework, lessons, challenges and prerequisites for EWSs. The sixth chapter summarizes views of CCSF members on the institutional and technical architecture of the Violence Early Warning System. Chapter seven provides key recommendations to CCSF on how to structure and implement a Violence EWS.

Chapter 2

Nature and character of violence in Zimbabwe

Introduction

An effective EWS should be informed by sound understanding of the context and nature of conflict to be addressed. The CCSF is mainly interested in preventing the occurrence of politically motivated violence. This chapter will discuss views of CCSF members, other civil societies and scholars on the nature and character of violence in Zimbabwe.

Historical Perspective

In order to fully understand the nature and character of violence in Zimbabwe, it is important to start with historical lens. Mukonori (2011) has argued that Zimbabwe has a long history of violence from the pre - colonial period characterised by wars of dispossession, intra-state fighting, colonialism and then resistance to colonialism by blacks leading to independence in 1980. Sachikonye (2011) observed that while violence was a decisive instrument in the attainment of independence, it has become a major divisive force.

Political violence is not only waged against opponents of particular political formations it also occurs within the same political formations and can sometimes be perpetrated against innocent civilians. In Zimbabwe, intra-party violence dates back to the days of nationalist movements against colonialism. Apart from violence within the nationalist movements there was also a great deal of violence exercised by guerrillas against civilians (Ibid).

The history of political violence in the post independence Zimbabwe can be traced to the ferocious violence committed by the military during the Gukurahundi era of 1982 to 1987. Today, violence has remained a cancer that corrodes the country's political culture and invariably blocking its democratic advance[2].

The **'Zimbabwe We Want'** document, produced by the Church in 2005 confirmed the above when it observed that:
'*Political intolerance has unfortunately become a culture in Zimbabwe. This has*

[2] *Sachikonye L (2011), When a State turns on its citizens, Institutionalized Violence and Political Culture, Jacana Media, Johannesburg*

mainly taken the form of intolerance of dissent and political plurality. The unwillingness to accommodate political differences is shown by the tendency to label anyone who criticises the dominant view as an enemy of the revolution. The trading of insults and hate speech has unfortunately been characteristic of inter- and intra-political parties. Intolerance breeds hatred, and hatred breeds violence, and violence leads to destruction. This cycle became particularly visible before some elections in the past where intimidation of political opponents, violence, murder, extortion, and dispossession were commonly reported. The culture of violence, fear, suspicion and hate cannot build a nation[3].

Characterization of violence in Zimbabwe

According to Cooney and Phillips (2010), there are many dimensions of analysing violence in Zimbabwe. One way is to understand the relationship between perpe-trators and victims **(relational dimension)**. In this dimension, violence is meted on perceived opponents or sympathisers of opponents in specific areas (EISA, 2010, HR Forum, 2008 e.t.c).

The second is to interrogate the location and time at which violence occurs **(situ-ational dimension)**. Two approaches can be used to understand this dimension: one is the election cycle approach where violence deepens a few months before polling. The second approach is the systematic mapping of violence prone areas such as party strongholds, swing constituencies, densely populated areas e.t.c. A swing constituency is one where the difference in total votes is less than 10% gen-erating intense competition amongst political parties (Freedom House, 2011).
The third dimension is an analysis of the impact or costs of violence such as harm to persons or property **(Impact dimension)**.

The fourth dimension involves an understanding of the underlying motives of those involved in political violence **(motivational dimension)**. In Zimbabwe, as argued by Masunungure (2010), Sachikonye (2011) and Chitiyo (2009), the under

lying motive is mainly to retain or gain political power at all costs. EISA (2010) also confirmed this view when it concluded that:-

'... Elections, by their very nature, are uncertain and competitive processes. Violence ensues in situations where there is a strong possibility of changing existing power relations and the incumbents are unwilling to cede power. This has been the case in Africa, as elections are often associated with tension and the eruption of social antagonism over the capture and control of the State. Much can be attributed

---

[3]*'Zimbabwe We Want' Discussion document produced by churches in 2005 (The Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops Conference (ZCBC) and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC))*

to the dominance of one party and an intolerant political culture relating to the opposition. In the context of authoritarian regimes the strategic intent
and practical consequences of violent acts are designed, in many ways, either to vitiate the elections altogether or to influence voting behaviour through threat or intimidation...[4]

The last dimension seeks to understand the manifestation of violence by unearthing the tools and tactics employed in political violence **(Violence tactics dimension)** Cooney and Phillips (2010), argued that the types of violence (tactics) used are related in a theoretical way to the motive. Torture, abductions and murder are usually used for the purposes of totally silencing or exterminating strong dissenting voices. Assaults, coercion and denial of access to basic public services may be intended to sway people away from their parties or punish them for identifying themselves with a particular party. In cases where one is perceived to be having crucial information, significant influence and followership and therefore a potential blockade to ascendancy to power of a particular candidate or political party ruthless tactics are employed.

Causes of violence can be categorised into three groups namely:- 1) root causes, proximate causes and triggers (Cilliers, 2005). The root causes include ideological differences, quest to retain or gain power, ethnicity and marginalization, greed and competition for resources, poverty and unemployment. It is widely agreed that youths who are unemployed or uneducated are most likely to be used as perpetrators of political violence by the political leaders. Proximate causes include feelings of loss to a particular candidate for example what happened after March 2008 elections, unresolved past disputes, shifting loyalties to political parties' e.t.c. Triggers include utterances by political actors, media vitriol, denial of access to certain public services, insults, trespassing into someone's area or
property, personal vendetta e.t.c (Ibid)

Political violence in Zimbabwe can be framed into the following categories, which indicators must be tracked by an EWS:

- Structural violence
- Gender based violence
- Physical violence
- Psycho-social violence

---

[4]*EISA (2010, When Elections Become a Curse Redressing Electoral Violence in Africa, Paper 1, EISA Policy Brief Series, Pretoria*

a. Structural Violence

Masunungure (2010) and Sachikonye (2011) have argued that violence in Zimbabwe is embedded within the structures and apparatus of political parties and in some cases fused within state processes and structures. Sachikonye (2011) has maintained that violence in Zimbabwe especially in 2008 is systemic and systematic. This is contrary to the view by some political parties that violence is sporadic and has a criminality rather than political intent. If anything, also argued Makumbe (2011), concurring with Sachikonye, that if there is any criminality it is merely an off-shoot of the underlying and well coordinated political motive. The case of Zimbabwe concluded Sachikonye (2011) is a case of 'a state turning on its citizens'.

A number of people interviewed during the study indicated that violence in Zimbabwe is institutionalized. They argued that a number of institutions have been named over and over again for alleged involvement in violence including security forces, local government structures and para-military structures. A number of these institutions have however denied these allegations.

Civil society organizations cited a number of issues including selective application of the law, denial of access to public services on the basis of political party affiliation and how the indigenization drive sometimes manifest itself as few examples to illustrate how systemic is violence in Zimbabwe. Reports of citizens failing to access food aid because they belong to the wrong political party are common place. Partisan distribution of food, ARVs and other features reportedly characterise life in rural areas. As reported by the Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) (April 2012) in Mhondoro Mubaira, for example, the Basic Education Assistance Module, like food aid, is being politicized with supporters of particular parties benefiting while others are marginalized[5].

Notorious vigilante groups such as Chipangano are reportedly supported and recognized by political parties. The Secretary for ZANUPF Women's League, Oppah Muchinguri who is also a co-chairperson of the JOMIC Operations Com mittee was quoted by the Newsday admitting that the notorious group is hired by political parties. The Newsday had this to quote:-

'*...An MDC colleague told me that when some people in his party wanted to deal with another person in the same party, they would also hire Chipangano. These youths are being used by politicians and Chipangano is on hire*'[6]

---

[5] *ZESN, Ballot Update Bulletin, Issue 3, April 2012*
[6] *'Chipangano for Hire: Muchinguri', NewsDay, 5 June 2012, Harare*

b. Gender Based Violence

Women, who in most cases constitute the majority in the rural areas, have been exposed to various forms of violence. They key forms of violence include rape, forced participation in meetings, denial of access to basic services and social threats.

Chitsike (2012), pointed out that women are subjected to violence as political parties fight their battles over women's bodies. She said that women are unable to run away as their men folk do because of domestic responsibilities of looking after children and the elderly. She said that in many cases women suffer for their partners, children and family members who are involved in politics and, in most cases, not themselves. Some women experience double tragedies. First they experience politically motivated sexual violence, sometimes even leading to HIV infection. Secondly, perhaps even more painfully their own partners, perhaps the cause of the violence perpetrated against them, will divorce them afterwards[7].

c. Psychological violence

A number of civil society organizations and human rights activists reported that they have been receiving anonymous calls and emails threatening them. Some reported that there are always people tracking them. Others reported that their emails take time to deliver, raising suspicion of interception of information. The media has also been abused by political parties to churn out hate and divisive messages.

d. Physical Violence

Political violence in Zimbabwe is becoming more and more sophisticated. The tools and methods of perpetrating violence are also evidently becoming sharper.

Physical and even lethal violence has generally assumed the following key forms:

- Abductions
- Torture (Both Psychological and physical)
- Rape and other forms of sexual violence
- Arson
- Murder
- Displacements
- Unlawful and unjustified arrests
- Forced attendance to meetings
- Coercion to pay contributions towards political party activities

[7] *Chitsike K (2012), Do we really matter? Women's Voices on politics, participation and violence, Women's Programme, Research and Advocacy Unit, Harare*

Most of this violence has been targeted at political opponents. There has also been deliberate targeting of workers movements, students, churches and the rural population to mention only a few.

The Human Rights NGO Forum, Counselling Services Unit, the Zimbabwe Peace Project, ZimRights, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, among others, have documented cases of human rights violations including politically motivated violence in Zimbabwe since 2000. Although many organizations are documenting cases of human rights violations at a local or national scale, not many of these reports are publicly available. Table 1 below shows the number of cases of politically motivated violence or human rights violations documented by the Human Rights NGO Forum between 2001 and 2008. The researchers are aware that given the sophisticated nature of violence in Zimbabwe and constraints to get information on every violation that occurs across the country, the actual figures may actually be much higher than is presented below.

Table 1: Cases of Human Rights Violations

Type of Violence	Period							2008 Only from Jan to April
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	
Abductions	116	223	52	62	18	11	19	137
Arrests / Detentions	670	274	627	389	1286	2611	2766	922
Disappearances	0	28	4	0	0	0	0	19
Murder	34	61	10	3	4	2	3	107
Political discrimination	194	388	450	514	476	288	980	2987
Torture	903	1173	497	389	136	366	603	723

Source: NGO Forum Reports

Zimbabwe's state security sector comprising of a number of actors, namely Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), Central Intelligence Organization and the Zimbabwe Prison services have been fingered for playing a part in political violence in Zimbabwe. Other actors that have also been implicated in electoral violence include the youth militia, vigilante groups such as Chipangano and the War Veterans Association.

The accusations against security forces partly stem from their involvement in a number of widely discredited operations that resulted in displacements, injuries, deaths, rape cases, loss of property and many other forms of human rights violations (Chitiyo, 2009). Recent and vivid examples include operation restore order

(Murambatsvina) in 2005, military intervention to stop illegal diamond mining in Chiadzwa, commonly known as "Operation Hakudzokwi (You will never come back) and the alleged involvement of the security sector in the violence that followed the March 2008 harmonized elections, which some people code named Operation Wakavhotera papi (whom did you vote for) and many others (Ibid).

The security forces, particularly the Zimbabwe National Army deny these accusations. For example, in response to a flurry of media articles pointing to the 'military factor' in the violence that paralysed Zimbabwe during the Presidential run-off elections, the Deputy Public Relations Officer had to issue a statement dissociating the army from politically motivated violence. He had this to say:-

'..*The Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) wishes to raise concerns over articles being published in the print and the electronic media on allegations relating to the alleged political violence, assaults.....the army categorically distances itself and any of its members from such activities..*'[8]

Although the security forces deny accusations for involvement in violence, they are on record for saying that they will not salute political leaders with no liberation credentials. For many Zimbabweans, this is a clear reference to the Movement for Democratic Change. Not surprisingly therefore, the security sector is widely perceived as a key component of ZANU PF's power retention game plan. An example of clear partisan nature of the military in politics are the utterances of Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba who told traditional chiefs, solders and the police at the 3-3 infantry battalion in Mutare on October 23, 2010, that no person without revolutionary credentials will be allowed to rule Zimbabwe. The same General told a weekly newspaper that:

Truly speaking, I am ZANU PF and ZANU PF is in me and you can't change that'[9]

The role of the security sector in Zimbabwean politics is an issue of concern to many, raised in all the five focus group discussions, during the study. There is also a wide range of literature to support this. For example, a Crisis Coalition in

Zimbabwe Report(2011: 9) noted that:

'... *Over the past decade, Zimbabwe has witnessed a gradual militarization and politicization of electoral institutions characterised by several appointments of personnel with a military background to run institutions responsible for elections such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and the Delimitation Commission*'[10].

[8] *Zimonline, 8 May 2008, Zimbabwe: Army Speaks on political violence, www.zimonline.co.za*
[9] *Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe (2011), The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs, Crisis Coalition, Harare, pp 11*
[10] *Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe (2011), The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and*

The security sector has reportedly not only been deployed to electoral institutions but also to a wide array of state institutions and parastatals such as the Grain Marketing Board, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation, Sports Commission, Minerals Marketing Cooperation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) e.t.c (Ibid)

Perhaps in admittance to the involvement of the security sector in politics, and the imperative of moving away from such, section 13 (1) of the Global Political Agreement (GPA had to make it clear that:

'...State organs and institutions (including army, police and intelligence services) do not belong to any political party and should be impartial in the discharge of their duties..'[11].

Civil society organizations in Zimbabwe has a result been calling for security sector reform in line with section 13 (1) of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). This is even more pertinent noting the historical relations, emanating from the liberation struggle, between the security sector, ZANU PF Party and Government. Section 13 (2) (b) calls upon the parties to the GPA to ensure that all state organs and institutions strictly observe the principles of the rule of law and remain non-partisan and impartial.

During the time of the study, the Zimbabwe National Army was allegedly recruiting many young people even those perceived to be under qualified. The pur
pose for such a recruitment overdrive is not clearly understood and can therefore only be interpreted using political lens. According to Crisis Coalition,

...the Finance Minister Tendai Biti disclosed to Parliament on Wednesday 13 June 2012 that the Public Service Commission had illegally recruited 10 000 staffers among them 4 600 soldiers. The secret recruitment of soldiers comes a few days after reports alleged that Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa had threatened to unleash generals on Biti for refusing to release $2.5 million for the army's operations[12].

The alleged recruitment also comes barely a month after Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA)'s Chief of Staff, Major General Martin Chedondo, told State

media that the army is taking up a new recruitment policy that will see the army recruiting from villages (Ibid).

Electoral Affairs, Crisis Coalition, Harare
[11] *Section 13 (1) of the Global Political Agreement signed on the 15th of September 2008 by ZANU PF Party and the two MDC formations.*
[12] *See Crisis Report, 15 June 2012 by Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe*
(Based on completed questionnaires and focus group discussions)

Hot Spots

Although violence is a national phenomenon, it is concentrated in specific areas. In this regard, some generalizations can be made based on analysis of trends. For example, violence has generally been high in swing constituencies such as Bikita; political party strongholds such as Uzumba, Maramba Pfungwe; highly populated residential and peri-urban settlements such as Mbare, Epworth, Caledonia Farm and Sakubva. High Density areas are characterized by large numbers of unemployed youths. These are engaged and used as the main perpetrators of political violence. On a national scale, political violence is relatively lower in the Southern Provinces (Matabeleland Provinces) and higher in the Northern Provinces (Mashonaland and Manicaland Provinces).

With the exception of densely populated settlements like Mbare, Chitungwiza and Epworth in Harare, violence appears to have a rural and peri-urban face. The low density residential areas, in many parts of the country are the least affected by political violence. The Table below summarizes some of the Hot Spots.

Table 2: Violence Hot Spots

Name of Province	Hot Spots
1. Harare	Mbare, Epworth, Chitungwiza, Domboshava and Hatcliffe
2. Manicaland	Nyanga, Buhera South, Mutasa, Chimanimani East, Chipinge Central, Mutare West, Makoni
3. Mashonaland Central	Mazowe South, Chiweshe, Bindura South, Mount Darwin
4. Mashonaland East	Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe, Motoko, Mudzi, Murerwa, Chokomba East
5. Mashonaland West	Magunje, Karoi, Hurungwe
6. Masvingo	Bikita West, Gutu North Gutu South, Zaka West
7. Matabeleland North	Binga, Nkayi
8. Matabeleland South	Matobo North, Mangwe, Umguza, Insiza, Beitbridge
9. Midlands	Mberengwa, Kwekwe, Chirumanzu, Gokwe, Silobela, Zvishavane

Attacks on civil society

A worrying trend, particularly in the recent months, is emerging where civil society space is shrinking fast. The key challenges being faced by NGOs include the recent ban of NGOs in Masvingo, infiltration and demobilization of the civil society sector in response to the growing effectiveness and watchdog role of civil society on

human rights issues exposing repressive tendencies and systematic attacks on activists, human rights campaigners and defenders.

The common types of attacks on civil society and activists are as follows:-

Legislative attacks: through among others Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Criminal Code used selectively and also against professionals/ technocrats within the state institutions.

Administrative attacks: There are allegations of public service officials who can hold-up progress by not cooperating with individuals perceived to be from the other political party.

Political and physical attacks: Civil society has reported to physical attacks by individuals acting with impunity.

Psychological – This include surveillance, disruption of meetings, thefts, use of state controlled media e.t.c

Internal threats and attacks – These refer to infiltrations, cooption, agents' provocations who cause splits e.t.c[13].

The latest incident of continued attacks on civil society is the charging of the Executive Director of the Human Rights NGO Forum, Mr Abel Chikomo for allegedly violating the Private Voluntary Organizations Act. Mr. Chikomo received summons on Tuesday 3 July 2012 for managing and operating an 'illegal private voluntary organization'. He is expected to close operations until his organization is registered. The Forum is registered as a common law association.

Violence during the constitutional process

The constitutional process has also been marred with violence. According to the Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism[14] on the Global Political Agreement (2011), Manicaland and Masvingo provinces topped the charts in terms of the number of violent attacks and cases of intimidation reported. In Manicaland, public consultations were cancelled following outbreaks of violence.

---

[13] *See also CCP-AU Conference Report on Shrinking Operating Space, November 2011, Johhanesburg, South Africa.*
[14] *Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM), Annual Review of the Performance of the Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe*

Conclusion

This chapter provided an overview of the nature of violence in Zimbabwe. It is clear that violence in Zimbabwe takes various forms. The proposed CCSF Violence Early Warning System should thus remain cognisant of these forms and accordingly develops appropriate mechanisms to monitor each of these. The next chapter will focus on the current responses by both state and non-state actors. On the basis of this and the next chapter, it will be possible to discuss the proposed EWS.

Chapter 3

Current responses to violence

Introduction

A number of initiatives have been put in place to try and address issues of political violence. In this chapter, we will highlight the key initiatives by the Government of National Unity under the auspices of the Global Political Agreement and also by civil society organizations. The purpose of this chapter is to identify possible opportunities and bases upon which the proposed Violence EWS can be developed.

JOMIC

The Global Political Agreement provides for the establishment of the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC). The primary purpose of establishing this Committee is to ensure full and proper implementation of the letter and spirit of this Agreement. JOMIC is composed of four senior members from ZANU-PF and four senior members from each of the two MDC Formations. Article 22 (3) of the GPA outlines the key functions of JOMIC as follows:-

- To ensure the implementation in letter and spirit of this Agreement;
- To assess the implementation of this Agreement from time to time and consider steps which might need to be taken to ensure the speedy and full implementation of this Agreement in its entirety.
- To receive reports and complaints in respect of any issue related to the implementation, enforcement and execution of this Agreement.
- To serve as catalyst in creating and promoting an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding between the parties.
- To promote continuing dialogue between the Parties[15].

JOMIC is therefore the principal body dealing with the issues of compliance and monitoring of the GPA. It is through JOMIC that all complaints, grievances, concerns and issues relating to implementation shall be channelled[16].

In Article 18 (5) of the GPA, parties committed themselves to, among others:-

(a) promote the values and practices of tolerance, respect, non- violence and dia-

---

[15] *Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement*
[16] *More information on JOMIC : www.jomic.co.zw*

logue as means of resolving political differences;

(b) renounce and desist from the promotion and use of violence, under whatever name called, as a means of attaining political ends;

(c) apply the laws of the country fully and impartially in bringing all perpetrators of politically motivated violence to book;

(d) do everything to stop and prevent all forms of political violence, including by non-State actors and shall consistently appeal to their members to desist from violence;

(e) to take all measures necessary to ensure that the structures and institutions they control are not engaged in the perpetration of violence[17].

JOMIC has been a target of a number of capacity building initiatives for it to effectively play its role. For example, following a decision in 2011 to enhance the capacity of JOMIC, SADC recently seconded two people to assist JOMIC in implementing its mandate.

In the recent months, JOMIC achieved two milestones. The first milestone was the establishment of provincial offices. The second milestone was the setting up of Provincial Liaison Committees. The liaison committees will work as an early warning mechanism before a conflict situation explodes into open violence. The nine members who constitute each committee are drawn from the same locality for easy interaction. It was also felt that members would be more familiar with their environment to be able to appreciate the political dynamics at play in most cross-party disputes. There are also plans to incorporate other stakeholders such as traditional leaders, civil society organizations, faith based institutions e.t.c in these structures[18].

However during the interviews a number of stakeholders said that although JOMIC has from the beginning been a welcome development, it generally lacks the 'teeth' to stop violence. Its work is bound by intra-party dynamics which makes it difficult to hold principals of the GPA accountable for politically motivated violence. About 54% of respondents said that JOMIC will only be effective if the principals of the GPA give it the 'teeth' to do so.

During the CCSF meeting in Bulawayo it also became clear that there is no coordination framework between JOMIC and the Organ on National Healing. JOMIC is more interventionist, though in a reactionary mode, than the Organ which believes that their core mandate is simply to develop a framework for national healing.

[17]*Zimbabwe Global Political Agreement*
[18] *JOMIC News, JOMIC Milestones, First Quarter 2012, Jomic*

Further to this, the fact that JOMIC is largely funded by International Cooperating

Partners, and not by government, may provide pointers on the level of political will to see to it that the institution functions optimally.

In spite of any inherent weaknesses, JOMIC is a key institution that the proposed CCSF Violence EWS should work with in identifying early signs of violence and consequently triggering early responses.

Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration

Another institution created by the Government of National Unity is the Organ on National Healing and Reconciliation. Its primary purpose, as the name suggest, is to promote reconciliation, national cohesion, healing and culture of tolerance.

The Organ on National Healing Reconciliation (ONHRI) and Integration was also established as a mechanism to end the vicious cycle of violence. However, many stakeholders argued that there is a lot to be desired in the implementation of Article 7 of the GPA on national healing.

Amongst its successes, include consultative processes to identify issues and ways forward done in consultations with civil society in 2010. The Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration also drafted a voluntary code of conduct for political parties. The full implementation of the Code of Conduct will be tested in the run up to elections.

Recently the Cabinet approved a policy framework which is expected to guide and direct national healing and peace building efforts in Zimbabwe. The policy provide for the establishment of a National Peace and Reconciliation Council (NPRC) made up of nine members, four of whom must be women and will be free from political interference.

A number of civil society organizations and stakeholders have however criticized the Organ, arguing that it has not measured up to its mandate nor to the expectations of stakeholders. For example, one political commentator had this to say in the Standard Newspaper :

'The Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration is a mere politicking tool by the parties in government or does not have the will and capacity to achieve its mandate as enunciated in Article VII of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The Organ exists only on paper and is meant to create a false impression that government is committed to dealing with the scourge of politically-linked human rights violations committed by various persons in the past"[19]

[19]*http://www.thestandard.co.zw/opinion/24783-sundayopinion-organ-on-national-healing-a-farce.html, 22 May 2010*

Other stakeholders have argued that the location of the Organ in the Office of the President has tended to somewhat create barriers for easy access in the eyes of an ordinary person.

On its part the ONHRI feels it has done the best it can given the context, available resources and political pressures[20]. It also added that its mandate is not to intervene but to create a framework for national healing. In this regard, argued the Co-Chairpersons, the Organ must be commended for coming up with the national policy. The Organ has also however initiated a number of peace building projects including the history project, sporting events and school based peace campaigns, among its other adhoc projects[21].

Some of the stakeholders contacted argued that the challenge of the ONHRI is not just political will to ensure meaningful healing, reconciliation and integration. It is also that its work has not been accompanied by requisite legislative reforms in order to give impetus to its work. For example, an Act of Parliament that clearly outlines the role of the National Peace and Reconciliation Council (NPRC) would be useful. One of the Co-Chairpersons of the Organ, Ms. Holland, reported during the CCSF meeting that the enactment of a Bill is the next step after the adoption of the policy paper[22]. Equally important is that other laws such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act and Public Order and Security Act need to be repealed.

Notwithstanding the explanation from the Organ, nearly 68% of civil society contacted during the study negatively appraised the ONHRI. A few however appreciated its efforts to reach out to civil society and to find creative ways of promoting peace and stability. As is the case with JOMIC, the CCSF still has to explore ways of feeding into and cooperating with the ONHRI.

Electoral conflict management mechanism

The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission is reportedly working on an election related conflict mechanism. Although this initiative was not known by many respondents, it was still appreciated as a step in the right direction, provided it will take off the ground and achieve intended objectives. During the CCSF meeting in Bulawayo, the Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, Justice Mutambanengwe, had this to say:-

---

[20]*Based on a SADC-CNGO Assessment Mission report to Zimbabwe, November 2011.*
[21] *See Presentation by Hon. S Holland and inputs by Hon. M. Ndlovu during the CCSF Bi-Annual Conference in Bulawayo on the 27th to the 28th of June 2012.*
[22] *See Report of the CCSF Bi-Annual Conference, 27-28 June 2012*

The area of political violence is a political minefield as it is fraught with counter accusations....In addition, efforts by ZEC to promote tolerance and peace through multi-party liaison committees is compromised by the fact that most members of these committees have little or no influence on their political parties..[23]

The Chairperson of the Commission also reported that ZEC has plans to engage in Multi-stakeholder dialogues bringing together civil society, JOMIC, Organ, CO-PAC and political parties to dialogue on the need for peaceful elections.

Civil society initiatives

A paraphernalia of civil society peace building, political analysis and violence monitoring mechanisms exist. The proposed violence EWS should therefore anchor itself on these existing initiatives. The initiatives include periodic analysis of the political situation, election monitoring and observation, violence monitoring, community building peace initiatives as well as research and documentation of human rights violations. The few examples listed are not in any way exhaustive or special. They are mentioned here because a number of stakeholders alluded to them during the study.

a. Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe

The Crisis Coalition produces daily and weekly Crisis Reports which analyses po
litical developments and their implications on peace, democracy and stability in Zimbabwe.
A number of stakeholders acknowledged the lead role of Crisis Coalition in political analysis and appreciated the value addition arising from the Crisis Report in their lobby and advocacy.

b. Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP)

Nearly all respondents contacted acknowledged that the Zimbabwe Peace Project implements a fairly comprehensive violence monitoring mechanism anchored on 420 monitors domiciled in each electoral constituency of the country. The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) was conceived shortly after 2000 by a group of faith-based and human rights organisations working or interested in human rights and peace-building initiatives, and was to become a vehicle for civic interventions in a time of political crisis. In particular, ZPP sought to monitor and document incidents of politically motivated human rights violations. The ZPP reports are published in retrospect[24].

---

[23]*Speech by Justice Mutambanengwe, during the CCSF Bi-Annual Conference on 27 and 28 June 2012, in Bulawayo.*
[24] *ZPP Monthly Report, April 2012*

Many civil society organizations appreciated the monthly situation analysis or violence reports from ZPP. Although there was consensus on the usefulness of information from ZPP, the CCSF members were divided on how the proposed EWS should be pitched and situated in relation to what ZPP is doing. Two distinct voices emerged. The first voice (56 % of contacted respondents) was that CCSF should proceed to establish its own EWS by broadening the scope of the indicators to be tracked and ensure that ZPP becomes a key contributor in reporting on violence indicators. The second voice (from about 34% of respondents) was that there is no need to establish another violence EWS except to support the work being done by ZPP and its members. The rest were indifferent.

c. Centre for Peace Initiatives

The Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa facilitated the coming together of eminent persons to constitute the Zimbabwe Elders. The objective of the initiative is to find ways of using good offices to discourage political violence. The Zimbabwe Elders Initiative was launched by the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe in June 2011. It is hoped that the initiative will link with community and regional mediation initiatives in order to address violent conflict in Zimbabwe.

d. Zimbabwe Election Support Network

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network has long term monitors in each con stituency which monitors the entire election cycle. These monitors help monitor election related violations.
ZESN produces and circulates its monthly bulletin that reports on the election environment and other related issues.

e. Ecumenical Peace Observation Initiative of Zimbabwe

The researchers were made aware of a number of initiatives being implemented by various denominations and apex organizations of churches. It is the church, through the Catholics Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation that documented the Gukurahundi massacres. One key example that was flagged out is the proposed Ecumenical Peace Observation Initiative of Zimbabwe. The objective of this initiative is to bring together churches to monitor and report on violence whilst promoting peace and tranquility.

f. Community peace building initiatives

 There are also a number of community peace building initiatives by a civil society organizations such as Centre for Conflict Management and Transformation

(CCMT), Peace Building Network of Zimbabwe, HABAKUK Trust, ZIMCET, CIVNET, Shalom Trust, Ecumenical Leaders Forum Trust, Peace Ambassador Training by the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, Youth Forum, Bulawayo Agenda, Centre for Community Development Trust, DP Foundation, Community mediation by the Methodist Church in Bulawayo, Peace Prayers by church groups, community dialogues, community peace clubs and Nhimbes by Heal Zimbabwe Trust e.t.c. It is important to note that these initiatives are not presented in an exhaustive manner or any special considerations. It's because they were mentioned during the study. There could be many good initiatives scattered throughout the country. Albeit good, a number of these initiatives have been affected by lack of adequate resources, politically charged operating environment, protection of turf and competition for resources within civil society (Ngwenya, 2011).

g. Civil Society Support Mechanisms

A number of organizations particularly the Counselling Services Unit, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Doctors without borders, Women's Coalition of Zimbabwe, ZimRights e.t.c were commended for providing essential support services to victims of violence. These services include counselling to victims of political violence, medical and legal support. To that extend their role should be considered in the proposed EWS.

h. Human Rights Monitoring and Reporting

In addition to ZPP, other Human rights NGOs such as ZimRights, Counselling Services Unit, Lawyers for Human Rights, NGO Forum, Justice for Children and Women's Coalition are documenting and reporting on human rights violations. For example ZimRights has a specific initiative which measures the 'political temperature' based on trends in human rights violations. Other key organizations include VERITAS which documents and reports on legal issues.
Information dissemination organizations such as Kubatana and the African Community Publishing Trust (ACPD) were observed as key in reporting human rights violations.

Conclusion

There are a number of research, violence monitoring and peace building initiatives in Zimbabwe upon which the proposed EWS can anchor itself in the collection and analysis of early warning information. It is however important to note at this stage that these different initiatives are unique in their own ways. However, most of these initiatives, including the ZPP Violence Early Warning System, have a specific focus. The strength of the proposed CCSF EWS is to come up with a broad based

mechanisms that allows different aspects to be brought together and analysed in a coordinated fashion. For example whilst ZPP brings in trends in violence, Crisis Coalition will do the political analysis, Women's Coalition will do the gender analysis and Community Health Group will bring in social and public services related violations e.t.c.

Chapter 4

Early signs of recurrence of violence in Zimbabwe

Introduction

In this section, we discuss some of the early signs that should inform the CCSF in planning and designing its EWS. Suffice to say that the signs of likelihood of violence are already on the wall.

Resurgence of Violence

According to ZPP, there has been a steady rise of incidences of violence since the beginning of the year 2012. These include the recent case of murder of Cephas Magura, Chairperson for MDC-T, for Ward 1 in Mudzi North. The deceased, aged 58 was severely assaulted at Chimukoko Business Centre on Saturday 26 May 2012 at around 12pm. He was allegedly hit by a stone on the head and fell on the ground and was severely assaulted by youths who had come to disrupt the rally. The rally was disrupted just 30 minutes after it started.

In its Monthly Violence Report (April 2012), the ZPP, noted that

'Politically motivated human rights violations continued on the upward trend as the talk of holding elections this year gathered momentum. Since the beginning of the year ZPP has been witnessing a steady increase in politically motivated human rights violations across the country. The elections mantra was also laced up with controversies around the constitution making process with ZANU PF officials trashing the first draft produced by COPAC'[25].

According to ZPP there were 524 incidents of violence in April 2012, up from the 475 recorded the month of March 2012. Some of this violence is allegedly instigated by specific Members of Parliament.

In its weekly update, the Counselling Services Unit noted that from January to 22 June 2012 there were 164 new cases of politically motivated violence. Of these 6 were deaths[26].

---

[25] *ZPP Monthly Violence Report, April 2012*
[26] *Political Violence Update, Week beginning 9 June 2012*

The murders are reportedly becoming gruesome in order to send out a powerful warning to political opponents[27].

Resurfacing of political bases

Some of the community based organizations and members of CCSF contacted during the study indicated that there are signs of intensified community mobilization and consequent establishment of political bases. Such cases were reported in Mashonaland East and Manicaland. A number of political vigilante groups are emerging and in some cases out rightly terrorising residents. A classic example is the Chipangano which blatantly coerce residents of Mbare to attend their meetings, vote for a particular party and make contributions to them for their survival. The Newsday (4 June 2012) described Chapangano as a bloodletting reign of terror. The Newsday reported:-

"Chapangano has caused untold havoc at Mupedzanhamo and other Council run properties around Harare, to such an extent that in some areas, Harare city Council has been prejudiced of thousands of dollars in rentals which are now being paid to the feared group"[28]

Legal Harassment

Both civil society and members of political parties, particularly of the Movement for Democratic Change, have in the recent past been subjected to spurious charges and consequently suffered legal harassment. These charges have forced them to spend a lot of time in courts and waste their limited resources in litigation. As indicated above, an example is the charge against the NGO Forum Executive Director for operating without PVO registration, yet they have been in existence for over a decade.

Media vitriol and Utterances by Political leaders

An analysis of the utterances by political leaders via the media, rallies or other spaces provide pointers on the likelihood of violence. The Newsday provides a glimpse of this when it quoted Minister of Justice, Mr, Patrick Chinamasa as having said:-

---

[27] *See Sokwanele Newsletter, July 1, 2012*
[28] *'Chipangano bloodletting reign of terror, News Day, 4 June 2004, Harare*

"...I am not a prophet, but what I am going to say is prophetic. What I see as we approach elections is a war-mongering scenario, parties signing war mongering songs – tendency to provoke incidences to over blow them and exaggerate, to distort in order to allow a Syrian/Libyan-type Western Intervention"[29]

Actual developments on the ground show that Zimbabwe is heading for violence. Already, there is a flurry of strong articles and hate speech being churned out via the media by political parties. The state broadcaster and radio stations have not been spared in this. There is also a common concern that excessive airtime is being allocated to ZANU PF while opposition parties are denied equal access.

Disruption of meetings

The extent to which political rallies, meetings of NGOs and even hearings of Parliamentarians are being disrupted is quite telling in terms of the potential for the resurgence of violence as Zimbabwe nears the election days. There was a concern by many respondents that ZANU PF is allowed to hold its rallies without any restrictions, with minimum disruptions, a situation that does not apply to other partners in the inclusive government.

Security sector activities

A number of people interviewed during the study pointed out that the ongoing additional recruitments in the army and continued public utterances by security forces in support of President Robert Mugabe is a likely sign that the future elections will be hotly contested with possibility of security sector, though unofficially, involving itself in political processes. These developments are reminiscent of the 2002, 2005 and 2008 elections.

The situation is also compounded by the allegations of the different centres of power within government, more so within the context of an unclear succession debate. Some respondents argued that the military is in control of the affairs of the government and of the ZANU PF party.

Disappearances

In the recent months, civil society leaders have reported cases of growing intimidations and dissaapreances. In February 2012, Paul Chizuze a human rights campaigner allegedly went missing and was feared dead[30]. Chizuze is a paralegal officer who has been working with a number of human rights organizations in Zimbabwe.

---

[29] *'Chinamasa Predicts War', Newsday, Harare, Saturday 9 June 2009*
[30] *Human Rights activist feared dead', Newsday, Harare, Saturday 9 June 2009*

Attacks on civil society

There is a common trend of increased onslaught and targeted attacks on civil society. In March 2012, the Governor of Masvingo, Mr Titus Maluleke allegedly banned NGOs operating in Masvingo. He accused them for working in cahoots with the West to undermine ZANUPF. A number of civil society organizations roundly criticised the action. In all almost all provinces visited, civil society reported that there is increased surveillance and scrutiny of the work.

Recently, the Executive Director of the Human Rights NGO Forum, Mr. Abel Chikomo was charged by the police for operating an organization that is not registered under the Private Voluntary Organizations Act. This was noted just as a precursor of what to expect in the run up to elections.

Humanitarian and economic patronage activities

As indicated in the previous chapters there is an upward trend in the use of food aid and other public services as political weapons. In addition, new sources of patronage such as funds for projects, community trusts e.t.c are being used to lure youths into supporting specific political parties and sometimes in encouraging to be violent in their response to their political opponents.

Constitutional deadlock

The back and forth, media vitriol and mixed messages being churned out by political parties regarding the constitutional process is possibly a tip of the iceberg concerning the potential contestation and violence that may occur.

Conclusion

There are already signs that Zimbabweans may be heading for another violent election. The likely magnitude of the violence cannot however be predicted with certainty. The biggest challenge is on what could be done to stop the violence. The next section will focus on the EWS. It starts by providing a conceptual framework and concludes by outlining key lessons learnt from review of literature on EWSs.

Chapter 5

Early Warning Systems: Conceptual Framework and Key Success Factors

Introduction

A number of countries, sub-regional groups and the African Union have established EWSs. The African Union for example, has established an open source Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). This chapter will start by discussing the conceptual framework in order to help CCSF members understand the concept and practice of EWSs. It will also discuss lessons on structure and mechanics of EWS. It concludes by outlining key success factors for consideration by the CCSF.

Conceptual Framework

There is vast literature on early warning systems. The history of early warning systems can be traced to weather forecasting and later widely used in agriculture and disaster management sectors. The concept has significantly permeated through democracy and conflict transformation fields. This study has focussed itself on a violence early warning system. Schnabel (2007) defines an early warning system as the systematic monitoring and analysis of political, economic or social developments and their significance for conflictive and cooperative trends in a given country or region. A violence early warning system can therefore be defined as a mechanism of studying the unfolding and sometimes repetition of some specific events, incidents or public declarations, and their sedimentation in specific patterns that announces the imminence or likelihood of violence taking place (Ateya and Wisler, 2007).

Cilliers (2005), states that the aim of a violence early warning system is to identify critical developments in a timely manner, so that coherent response strategies can be formulated to either prevent violence or limit its destructive effects. Cilliers further contend that effective early warning involves the collection and analysis of data in a uniform and systematized way and according to a commonly shared methodology. It requires the formulation and communication of analysis and policy options to relevant end-users towards action.

EWSs should be premised on a human security as opposed to a state security paradigm. A human security approach argues for the safety and protection of human beings. It expresses the need of individuals for safety and security in all areas in-

cluding access to basic needs such as food, water, environmental and energy security, freedom from economic exploitation, protection from arbitrary violence by security forces e.t.c. (Sachs, 2003). According to Hendricks (2009) SADC Member States have exhibited a state-centric approach to early warning systems, whereby the focus is on the safety and protection of the state, particularly the government of the day and its interests.

In a basic form, contended Cilliers (2007) conflict early warning needs to tackle:

- Which issues cause, drive and fuel violence?
- Which factors can bring to an end the culture of violence?
- Who are the main drivers and players regarding violence?
- What could be done to end violence and to move towards sustainable peace?

According to Mersha (2007) an early warning system aims at picking signs that tell us about the likelihood of violence through collection of data, analysis and verification, and formulation of scenarios and response options, to support decision makers' ability to identify critical developments at an early stage and develop response strategies. In the case of political violence, the main task of the early warning mechanisms is to systematically collect data, monitor and submit reports about events likely to lead to violence in specific areas using an empirically based standard format.

Regarding the institutional architecture of an early warning system Mersha (2007) stressed that an effective violence early warning system is based on the existence of functional networks and partnerships not only amongst civil society but also with traditional leaders, research institutions, United Nations bodies, business and even political parties in order to generate useful information on time.

Any Violence Early Warning System consists of three steps:

- Systematic collection of violence relevant data;
- Analysis of this data; and
- Transfer of analytical insights into practice.

Even Biblically, argued the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, the church through its prophetic role and analysis of behaviours of certain individuals including leaders and observable trends is able to announce the imminence of trouble in future[31].

---

[31] *This is based on input to the study by an Officer from the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe on the role of the church in the EWS.*

According to Clarke (2007), these three steps require answers to distinct questions. First, what data is to be collected? What is relevant, and what is not? To this end, it is paramount to know what CCSF want to warn of. What form of violence does it intend to track? Second, which method(s) will be used to analyze the data? To what extent will the envisaged EWS use quantitative and qualitative analysis methods? Third, what is the time frame of the warning (one week, one month, three months or one year? Whom does CCSF want to warn? Who would be the appropriate recipient or end-user of CCSF analysis and warning? Finally, CCSF need to know how it will feed the information into decision- making processes.

Zenko et al (2011) also added that ideally, an EWS should include a comprehensive picture of the drivers of potential conflicts, a net assessment of the capabilities and intentions of the relevant parties, and specific recommendations for possible entry points for prevention or for adjustments to ongoing preventive activities.

Opoku (2007, added that an EWS should entail assessment for warning or identification of different scenarios, formulation of action proposals, transmission of recommendations and assessment of an early response. He further stated that in collecting data there is need for a multi-method approach for both qualitative and quantitative data. In this process, civil society can capitalize on local information networks composed of indigenous professionals, community based organizations, media and local structures whose access to and understanding of local information far exceeds that of international media commentators.

For them to be effective early warning systems should be both vivid and specific enough to attract the attention of communities, politicians and policy makers, who receive multiple sources of competing information (Clarke, 2007).

As mentioned above, transforming early-warning signals into concrete action is a key requirement in any early-warning exercise. At the same time, it is arguably also the most difficult step. Sometimes decision makers do not have the appropriate means at their disposal to implement early-warning measures. Sometimes another crisis is perceived as even more pressing and therefore absorbs all attention as well as all human and financial resources. Sometimes officials simply refuse to listen to civil society, because they find it hard to implement policies that have been generated outside their power structure. In other cases, political parties may not act on early signs because violence helps them achieve their political objectives. Evidently there is always a huge gap between early warning and early response. Early warning does not automatically trigger action.

Role of civil society

Civil society is today a catch all word as it is a cardinal element of democracy (Chandhoke, 2007; Whitefield, 2010; Cohen, 1994). As a fundamental concept in political theory, civil society has permeated nearly every aspect of politics and development, including early warning systems.

Paffenholz (2005), Whitefield (2010), HD Centre (2010) and Bond (2006) have maintained that whatever weaknesses civil society organizations may have they have an active role to play in EWSs and in conflict prevention and transformation in general.

Globally there is a move towards open EWS where a number of stakeholders, including civil society are involved in data collection, analysis and interpretation as opposed to a closed system. The African Union EWS is leaning more towards an open source while the SADC EWS remains closed, based on national intelligence systems.

An open source EWS, as argued by Cilliers (2005) tend to be decentralized and dependent upon civil society for information and analysis.

The role of civil society, and specifically organized civil society like CCSF, is evident in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In ECOWAS civil society has been active in EWS through the West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP) as well as the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). ECOWAS's EWS, like the Continental EWS is open source (Cilliers, 2007). In ECOWAS, for example, civil society analysis and recommendations on Guinea was well appreciated by ECOWAS (Opoku, 2007). In Ivory Coast, WANEP's policy briefs and recommendations about direct dialogue resulted in the Ouagadougou Accords (Ibid).

Civil society, globally, in its various forms and manifestations has thus asserted itself as an indispensable player or as others put it, the 'third sector' whose views and perspectives should, of necessity, be considered in EWSs and other peace processes (White,1994; Cawthra, 2010). It is with this view in mind that the CCSF is considering to develop its own Violence EWS.
It is unfortunate that the efficacy and consequences of civil society engagement with EWS, especially in the context of Zimbabwe, is understood poorly and is generally under-researched.

Opoku (2007) argued that the role of civil society should go beyond early warning information gathering to include a recognized responsibility endorsed by govern-

ments to intervene at local and national level through such initiatives as community mediation and other peace building initiatives.[32]

Key success factors of a violence early warning system

An analysis of EWS in different parts of the world shows that there are common pillars that make EWSs successful. These pillars or key success factors are discussed below, although not in an exhaustive manner.

1. Clarity of Purpose

The first question the CCSF must understand is the specific purpose of the EWS. In this regard it is important to also know the target audience for the early warning. The answer to this question depends in large measure on the type of crisis one is trying to predict (Clarke, 2007). Analyses must not only establish where violence is more likely to occur, but also, help shape strategies aimed at preventing and preparing for the occurrence of violence. Ideally, early warning analysis provides information in a form that is easily digested by senior decision makers, whether governments or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

2. Multiple data sources

Effective EWS draw information from multiple data sources for the purposes of triangulation and verification of information. Cilliers (2005) has maintained that early warning information should be timely, accurate, valid, reliable and verifiable. Reliance on a few sources may create biases and leads to generation of unreliable data. Although coming from multiple sources, this data will be analysed at a central hub which others call the situation room on the basis of an appropriate and agreed set of early warning indicators (Tiruneh, 2010). The situation room will also have to be connected to several local, regional and international news sights, UN information Centres, other EWS and civil society organizations, to mention only a few data sources. It is however important to note that in political charged environments data analysis and interpretation can be done from multiple centres. These centres should however coordinate their activities and outputs.

3. Grassroots linkages

Any centralized analytic and aggregating capacity needs to be balanced with engagement at a grassroots level. Analytic focus and responsibility can therefore usefully be 'pushed down' or devolved in a manner that ensures contact with

---

[32] *Opoku M.K (2007), West African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The role of civil society organizations, KAIPTC Paper No 19, September 2007*

events and analysts who are 'on the ground', allowing for both a macro and a micro focus. In this regard, the role of grassroots and constituency based CCSF members becomes useful. The Continental EWS for example was from the beginning to rely upon close cooperation and interaction with focal points located within Member States and with other institutions (Cilliers, 2005)

4. Building on existing initiatives

Nearly all people contacted during the study indicated that the proposed CCSF Violence Early warning system should not seek to destroy existing initiatives but rather add value. The CSSF should therefore ask themselves what will a new system accomplish that is not already achievable within the scope of what already exists. To this extent it is important to know how the envisaged CCSF system will link with existing analyses/approaches.

5. Simplicity

One critical aspect that emerged during the focus group discussions is the imperative of balancing the level of detail in analysis and sophistication of the EWS with the need for simplicity in its use. In order to ensure balanced analysis, a wide range of analysts at differing levels (local, regional, national and different backgrounds/ disciplines) should be engaged not necessarily in a full time basis. Early warning templates must therefore simplify complex concepts without undermining the integrity of the analysis. There is always a danger of over-intellectualizing peace-building or violence prevention efforts.

6. Continuous capacity building

During the study, nearly 69% of respondents indicated that they only have limited detailed understanding of the structure and workings of an early warning system. To that extent, they felt that continuous capacity building should thus be a key component of the roll out strategy on all the three tiers of an early warning: data collection, analysis and action.

7. Early responses

All people who participated in the study emphasised early actions as opposed to just monitoring and reporting on violence for the sake of it. However, translating early warning and assessment into early action presents another set of challenges. Many early warning staff and officials who produce specific reports of near-term crises believe that their efforts often go unnoticed by senior decision makers who face more pressing demands on their time. Suffice to say that within early warning

and preventive work, there has been increasing emphasis on strategies for policy influence and implementation of response mechanisms.

It can be argued therefore that early warning, analysis and recommendations for action are not pursued entirely for their own sake, but in order to inform decision-makers at all levels to find the most appropriate, effective and efficient responses to evolving crises. As Cilliers (2007) put it, an effective EWS should seek to close the gap between analysis, options and actions.

8. Reliability of information and data

Effective EWS should ensure that data collected is reliable and convincing. There is a tendency by some civil society organizations to exaggerate or say things purely taken from media reports without verifying the data.   There are organizations that sometimes try to cover too many districts, yet poorly and in unsystematic ways, with very little attention to detail and long-term analysis. This makes a strong case for focussed, rigorous, systematic and unbiased attempts to systematically collect and analyze information

9. Shared set of indicators

Data collection and analysis should be based on an agreed set of conflict or violence indicators. The indicators must be broad in scope covering political, economic, social, military and humanitarian issues (Cilliers, 2005). John Clarke (2007) argued that in a basic sense, there are three types of indicators with which early warning analysis is concerned:
Structural indicators, which very often consist of socio-economic and governance factors such as electoral system, poverty levels, role of security forces in governance e.t.c. Tiruneh (2010) added that if early warning is to anticipate violent conflicts, this cannot be understood without reference to root causes such as poverty, inequality, political representation and uneven distribution of resources.
Proximate indicators, or those which are 'closer' to the onset of conflict, and;
Triggering events (or the match that lights the structural and proximate 'fuel').

10. Base line data

All conflict response systems start off with a base-line assessment on the level of insecurity and threats to human security. Baseline reports are initial reports of the situation on the ground regarding violence in Zimbabwe. They contain the cause, actors, history and dynamics of political violence as well as the socio-economic and political situation. Reports produced by ZPP and the Human Rights NGO Forum, for example, could be useful baselines, notwithstanding any shortcomings that they may have.

11. Requisite infrastructure and technology

In order to function effectively, it is important for the EWS to have the requisite infrastructure and technology such as internet, radio, television stations and relevant mapping and analysis software.

12. Clear outputs

It is important at this scoping stage for the CCSF to decide on the outputs of an EWS. Early warning outputs vary in terms of frequency, formality and distribution. Some early warning reports are produced daily, while others circulate weekly, monthly, quarterly, annually or periodically. These early warning materials can also take a diversity of forms: ad hoc briefings, colour-coded risk rating maps, matrices, hot spots maps and compiled news items – to name but a few. Finally, early warning outputs vary widely in terms of their intended audience and distribution. Some reports are intended only for internal distribution while others may be for public consumption (Zenko et al 2011). For example, the situation room of the Continental Early Warning System circulate daily news briefs and monthly situation reports.

13. Partnerships

To operate effectively and efficiently EWSs should establish and nature functional networks and partnerships not only amongst civil society but also with traditional leaders, research institutions, United Nations bodies, business and even political parties in order to generate useful information on time.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a summary of some of the key success factors and lessons on EWS drawn from other existing structures

Chapter 6

Stakeholders' Views on the proposed Violence EWS

Introduction

This section summarises what the members of CCSF said regarding the institutional and technical architecture of the proposed Violence Early Warning System. The consultations focussed on seven issues: 1) Relevance of the Early Warning System. 2) Mandate of the EWS, 3) Institutional architecture of the EWS, 4) Indicators to be tracked, 5) Data collection and Analysis mechanism, 6) Outputs of the EWS, 7) Risk analysis framework.

1. Relevance of the Early Warning System.

Seventy five percent (75%) of all respondents said that the idea of a CCSF Violence Early Warning is relevant as a broad based rather than narrow and single organization focussed initiatives. The value addition of the CCSF initiative, argued some CCSF members is in its potential to create a coordinated and multi-pronged data collection and analysis strategy by churches and civil society as a collective. The proposed CCSF Violence EWS, added some members, will thus derive strength and find anchorage in complementary research, monitoring and analysis tracks by members of CCSF. Instead of seeking to replace existing initiatives, the proposed CCSF Violence EWS will bring together these different perspectives to ensure development of synergies, common analysis and implementation of collective early responses and jointly validated strategies.

69% of all people who said the early warning system is relevant however expressed reservations on whether it will take off and survive the test of time. The following reasons were cited: limited resources to establish a fully fleshed EWS; protection of turf by civil society; competition for visibility; probability of profiling of a few organizations at the expense of the others and the existing divisions within churches and civil society in Zimbabwe.

23% of CCSF members said it is not relevant. A number of reasons were put forward. First there are already existing initiatives, particularly the Zimbabwe Peace Project Violence Monitoring, Human Rights NGO Forum, Counselling Services Unit e.t.c. Secondly; others argued that the signs are already on the walls regarding the areas likely to be affected by violence. What is only required is to institute mechanisms of preventing the occurrence of violence.

Others felt that given the structural nature of violence, there may not be any political will from other partners of the Inclusive Government to stop the violence. This is compounded by the fact that neither JOMIC, ZEC and the Organ have sanctions leverage if dominant parties perpetrate violence.

Lastly others argued that unless the international Cooperating Partners commit resources to the EWS, there is no point starting an initiative that will become a still born.

2% of respondents were however indifferent on whether to establish the EWS or not.

It is crucial to however mention that all the church organizations contacted fully supported the idea of an EWS. Some of them however expressed concern that within the CCSF it is the civil society organizations that appear to be running the show and getting all the limelight and possibly resources. They therefore feared that the same situation may continue with the EWS.

2. Mandate of the EWS

Civil society organizations were generally unanimous on the mandate of the proposed EWS. In fact the views expressed by CCSF members on what the EWS should do are also consistent with international practices. The expected mandate can be summarised as follows:-

- Collecting, collating and analysing information and trends on political violence in Zimbabwe as well as other social, economic and political factors that may result in violence.
- Generation of scenarios and analysis of information to ascertain potential for violence.
- Disseminating information to policy makers, political actors and other stakeholders on situation on the ground and trends.
- To inform policy makers, political actors and other stakeholders of possible action to take in order to prevent occurrence of violence or minimise its destructive effects.
- Development and maintenance of databases and support mechanisms for members, human rights campaigners and defenders and other service providers for effective responses to violence.

3. Institutional Architecture of the EWS

There were different voices on the ideal institutional architecture of the proposed EWS. Three scenarios emerged during the study as follows:

- 25% said that the EWS should be a function within specific members of CCSF with a research, documentation and analysis capacity whose core business is on governance, elections, peace or human rights issues. This view emphasised first the need to build on existing initiatives –some of which already resemble some kind of an EWS- and secondly the necessity of multiple data collection, analysis and dissemination frameworks. Such a mechanism would help mitigate the risk of the EWS being closed, attacked or infiltrated if it operates as an independent and visible entity.
- 38% of respondents felt that the CCSF should be housed at NANGO as is the current situation. This group was leaning more towards an open centralised EWS.
- 22 % felt that the EWS should have its own offices as an independent mechanism as opposed to being housed by NANGO. The argument was that the EWS should not be seen as a NANGO initiative. Those who opposed this view argued that the environment is so charged that CCSF cannot afford to have a visible and centralized Hub, which may become an easy target by political actors who fear that they may be exposed by the EWS.
- The rest of the respondents were indifferent. They argued that what counts at the end of the day is whether there are early signs and early responses.

The two main options regarding the institutional architecture are: 1) a centralized EWS and 2) decentralised EWS.

Possible institutional architecture for the EWS

Option 1: Establishment of a Central Hub (Regardless of location)

In option one, whilst data collection and preliminary analysis will be done by individual CCSF members, comprehensive analysis and interpretation is done by the Central Hub for harmonization and possibly speaking with one voice. In option 2, data collection, analysis and interpretation is done by individual organizations. Only sharable outputs are sent to the CCSF Secretariat for wider dissemination, collective policy influence and collaborative actions based on a shared advocacy strategy.

Option 2: Decentralised data collection and analysis

Some of the respondents proposed that a comprehensive stakeholder analysis and capacity assessment should be conducted based on a specific criterion in order to define the specific roles of various members of the CCSF. The key considerations for the physical location of the EWS were noted as: - security of location; organizational credibility; perceived independence and neutrality by different stakeholders; organizational mandate with scope for EWS; and acceptability to a significant majority of the CCSF members. In addition, respondents emphasized that the system should not be partisan in its approach. It should be for the benefit of everyone using a human security approach.

In addition, some of the members of the CCSF emphasised the need for the EWS to anchor its work on hard evidence, which is partly generated by service based organizations such as those providing counselling, medical, housing and legal support services. This means the EWS should establish a connection between generic collectors of information and serviced based institutions. This requirement is not affected by the chosen institutional framework.

4. Indicators to be tracked

Indicators can be categorized as structural, proximate and trigger events. An ideal EWS should be able to track all the three types of indicators. Tiruneh (2010) has argued that the process of coming up with indicators is always problematic in the sense that there are always uncertainties of the cause and effect of the relationship between events and violence. However, most respondents felt that the main structural indicators are known. Emphasis should therefore be on proximate and trigger indicators. The list below captures the suggestions of stakeholders.

- Mapping and profiling of trends in human rights violations (both physical and psychological, looking at the different dimensions of violence discussed above).
- Establishment and operations of political vigilante groups.
- Frequency and nature of community level meetings.
- Nature of media reportage.
- Movements into or out of a specific areas and actions of specific individuals including the nature of their associations and contacts with particular individuals, groups and communities.
- Policies and conduct of government officials and political parties towards civil society.
- Speeches and conduct of security forces, including 'patrol' activities, scope and scale of deployments and recruitments.
- Nature of political party activities, starting at cell level
- Rules and procedures of accessing specific public services such as food aid, public employment e.t.c
- Interpretation and application of law on human security issues.
- Nature, timing and scope of specific economic 'empowerment initiatives' such as Upfumi kuvadiki.
- Management of specific electoral processes such as voter education, delimitation, voter registration e.t.c.
- Written and unwritten rules to access specific places and individuals.
- The roll-out and conclusion of the constitutional process.
- Analysis of power relations and centres of power within political parties.
- Analysis of succession debates and likely scenarios.

5. Data collection and Analysis mechanism

The following key points emerged from the focus group discussions regarding data collection and analysis:-

- The need for decentralized data collection framework that recognizes the role of various civil society organizations, CBOs, research and other international

human rights monitoring organizations in different parts of Zimbabwe.
- The need for skilled human resources to champion the collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of information. At a minimum the coordination should have a political analyst and a communications officer.
- Should the CCSF opt for a centralised system it should use multiple and open sources of data as opposed to secretive sources for triangulation, including field surveys, analysis of research and news reports as well as hard evidence from service based institutions.
- Data analysis should use both deductive and inductive analytical frameworks as well as qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods. Analysis can be aided by relevant computer software.
- The CCSF should utilize its clusters as think tanks to analyse and interpret data.
- Ensure balance between historical and current analysis of developments.
- The imperative of gender analysis of trends and implications on conflict potential.

6. Outputs of the EWS

There was unanimity that the primary purpose of the EWS should be to inform and trigger early responses. To that extent, emphasis was on a vibrant communication and advocacy framework to act on the information coming out of the EWS. However, it is important to separate the 'early warning' function from actual action, lest information is manipulated to support a particular action. The key proposed outputs are:

- Daily situation analysis or news updates which may be circulated via email. The information will be obtained from various sources including media, provincial contact points, political parties, activists, civil society e.t.c
- SMS Alerts to augment email updates, considering the growing network density.
- Monthly policy briefs.
- Monographs on specific themes and issues regarding violence.
- Violence maps, which can also be available in digital form.
- CCSF Website, where most of the outputs can be posted.
- Comprehensive quarterly reports mapping and profiling violence in different parts of the country.
- Based on the analysis, the CCSF should be able to periodically develop a collaborative and validated advocacy strategy with evidence.

7. Risk Analysis Framework.

Nearly all respondents admitted that there are risks associated with violence monitoring, EWS and in triggering specific responses. A number of potential risks were identified. These are listed below:-

* Victimisation of informants/CBO and CSO officers and journalists.
* Infiltration by state intelligence officers.
* Killing from within by CCSF Members.
* Lack of cooperation from CCSF Members to provide information on time.
* Abuse of the system by some members of the public who may end up giving false warnings.
* Abuse of the system by politicians to tarnish the image of other parties.
* Banning of civic society organisations from operating in specific areas and possible closure of the EWS Central hub.
* Limited rresources to establish the EWS
* Crisis of expectations amongst CCSF members and also with donors
* Contributions and credit for positive results not tricking down to individual CCSF members resulting in disinterest and weakening of CCSF.
* A suggestion was therefore made for the CCSF to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment before establishing the EWS and to generate mitigation strategies.

8. Early Response Framework

All respondents agreed that a concrete early response framework should be developed. In this regard Tiruneh (2010) said that EWSs should provide timely advice on potential violence and threats to enable the development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of violent conflicts. The key components of this framework will include continuous engagement with state structures such as JOMIC and the Organ; constant feedback and communication with broad civil society; strong linkages with print and electronic media in and outside Zimbabwe; functional solidarity and support networks with other civil societies in and outside Zimbabwe; functional contacts with regional and international bodies including with South Africa as Facilitator and SADC as guarantor of the Global Political Agreement.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the views of CCSF members and other civil society organizations regarding the proposed violence EWS. Based on the above and literature review, the last chapter will provide a list of recommendations to CCSF on possible steps moving forward.

Chapter 7

Conclusion and Recommendations

This section summarises the main conclusion of the study and provides recommendations concerning the proposed Violence EWS for CCSF.

Conclusion

The principle of an EWS is widely accepted by CCSF members and civil society in general. The main challenge is for the CCSF as a whole to engage in honest discussions at a political level to allay any potential fears that individual members may have and to address any identified risks that may arise from the establishment of the EWS and to mobilize sufficient resources for its operations. Its value addition should be derived from its broad focus, strengths in diversity and in churches and civil society working together towards a common goal. The EWS will augment and not seek to replace existing violence monitoring mechanisms.

Proceeding to establish the EWS without broad based buy in and ownership especially on contentious issues such as value addition to existing initiatives, location, resourcing and role of CCSF members may be suicidal.

Recommendations

On establishment of the EWS

- There is urgent need for political commitment and endorsement by the leadership of CCSF of the principle of a coordinated Violence EWS.
- The CCSF is presented with mainly two models regarding the institutional architecture of the Violence EWS, from which a hybrid can be chosen also. These are:1) Centralised EWS (With a Central Hub/Situation Room), whose location should be based on an agreed criteria and 2) A decentralized but linked framework based on existing civil society structures. Whichever model chosen by the CCSF, it must ensure connectivity with the grassroots whilst at the same time ensuring human security, objectivity, sustainability and value addition.
- Should the CCSF opt for a centralized EWS, which is the model used under normal circumstances, it should consider recruiting at least two people for the effective functioning of the EWS namely Analyst and Communication officer and to purchase relevant infrastructure and technologies.
- As soon as the institutional framework is agreed upon the CCSF members should adopt the indicators, data collection, analysis methods as well as report-

ing frameworks. This may imply a rapid audit of and consolidation of existing tools and methodologies whilst at the same time strengthening identified gaps.

- The proposed CCSF Violence EWS should work with and specifically seek to trigger early responses by existing institutions including but not limited to JOMIC, Organ on National Healing, Reconciliation and Integration, ZEC, Regional and International Community.
- The Management Committee of CCSF should manage any potential crises of expectations regarding the overall purpose and institutional architecture of the CCSF Violence Early Warning as well as issues of access to and utilization of resources for this purpose.
- Upon establishment of the EWS, CCSF must develop and implement a risk and security management plan.
- The management committee of CCSF should establish synergies with traditional leaders, media, political parties, research institutions and with other generators and users of information.

On proposed institutional framework

The proposed EWS should be linked to provincial focal points and supported by CCSF Clusters. The CCSF will report to the Management Committee of CCSF. The diagram below illustrates the proposed institutional arrangements. The Provincial Focal persons will be drawn from the CCSF membership. There is no need to create any new structures.

Diagram 3: Proposed institutional Framework for the Violence EWS

Data collection

Analysis

Action

Media
Traditional leaders
Activists
Local monitors
Political parties
UN
Research institutions
Citizen journalist
Civil society

CCSF Mgt Committee

Prov. Focal Point

Prov. Focal Point

Prov. Focal Point

Prov. Focal Point

CCSF EWS (Either centralized or *decentralized)*

CCSF Clusters

Media
JOMIC

Organ

Civil Society

GNU

SADC, AU, UN

Communities

On prevention of violence

The study recognizes that prevention of violence is an uphill task considering its drivers, nature and character. Some of the possible ways of reducing or preventing violence from occurring include:-

• Scaling up of community peace building initiatives such as those by HABA-KUK Trust, CCMT, Heal Zimbabwe Trust, ZIMCET Peace Committee, Peace Building Network of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Council of Churches, Ecumenical Peace Observatory Initiative, Peace Ambassadors Training e.t.c

• Multi-stakeholder dialogues at various levels which bring together political parties, state institutions, media and other stakeholders to promote tolerance, peace, national unity and integration. In this regard, JOMIC and traditional leaders can be useful partners.

• Encourage all political parties to implement the Code or Pact to work together against violence and to hold each other accountable for violence in specific constituencies as proposed by the ONHRI.

• Strengthening JOMIC and where possible support efforts to enhance its effectiveness and to demand responsibility and accountability from political parties for any violence that occurs in any constituency.

• Call upon SADC and other regional and international observers to deploy long term observers to Zimbabwe.

• Call upon SADC to impress upon parties to the GPA to stop security forces from meddling in politics.

• Supporting the development and implementation of electoral conflict resolution mechanism within the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) structures. Lessons can be drawn from Lesotho in this regard.

On civil society and solidarity mechanism

It is important that CCSF consolidate a rapid response and support mechanisms, alongside the EWS, with the following key components:-

• Risk and security management plan
• SMS Alert system
• Psycho-social and legal support services

- Solidarity networks within and outside Zimbabwe
- Toll free/ Hot lines e.t.c
- Contingency budget for eventualities

Conclusion

Establishing a Violence EWS is not an easy process. However, if allowed to function optimally, EWSs are crucial tools in violence monitoring and prevention. The CCSF has to work full throttle to galvanize political will and cooperation in data collection and analysis. A steadily growing number of international actors appear to be aware of the necessity to practice early monitoring and analysis of peace, stability and conflict dynamics; and to respond quickly to destabilizing forces and situations.

Bibliography

Cawthra G. (2010), The Role of SADC in Managing Political crisis and conflict-The Cases of Madagascar and Zimbabwe, Gaborone: FES,

Chandhoke N, 2007: Civil Society, Development in Practice, 17: 4-5, 607-614,

Cilliers J. (2005), Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa, ISS Paper 102, Pretoria

Cilliers J (2007) A conflict early warning system as support of the comprehensive peace agreement, ISS, Pretoria

CISOMM (2011), Annual Review of the Performance of the Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe, Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism, Harare

Clarke G (1998): Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World: Political Studies (1998), XLVI, pp 36-52)

Clarke J (2007), Principles and Practice Of Risk Analysis And Risk Reduction

Clayton A, (1996), NGOs, civil society and the state: Building democracy in transitional societies, OXFORD: International NGO Training and Research Centre

EISA (2010, When Elections Become a Curse Redressing Electoral Violence in Africa, Paper 1, EISA Policy Brief Series, Pretoria

Fisher, R.J. (1997), Interactive conflict resolution. Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press

HD Centre (2009), Annual Inside Mediators Retreat, HD Centre, Geneva

Hearn J (2001), Civil Society, Kleptocracy & Donor Agencies: What future for Africa? Review of African Political Economy, Vol 28. No 87, (March, 2001), pp 43-53

ICG (2008), 'Ending Zimbabwe's Nightmare: A possible way forward', Policy briefing, Pretoria/ Brussels, 16 December 2008, International Crisis Group (ICG)

Lederach, J. P. 1997. Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Masungure E, 2011, 'Zimbabwe at crossroads: Challenges for civil society' in Open Space, Vol, 2, OSISA, Johannesburg

Mersha B.(2007), Achievements and Challenges Of The CEWARN Mechanism In Ethiopia

Moore D (2005), ZANU PF and the Ghosts of Foreign Funding: Review of African Political Economy No 103: 135-204, ROAPE Publications Ltd, 2005

Moyo B, 2010, (Dis) Enabling the Public Sphere: Civil Society Regulation in Africa (Volume 1), Trust Africa, Johannesburg

Murithi T and Mawadza A (2011), Zimbabwe in Transition, a view from within, IJR, Johannesburg

Opoku M.K (2007), West African Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System: The role of civil society organizations, KAIPTC Paper No 19, September 2007

Paffenholz T. and Spurk C (2006) Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peace building, World Bank, Washington DC.

Raftopolous B, 2011, 'Why there won't be a North African Revolution In Zimbabwe', in Open Space Vol 2, OSISA, Johannesburg

Sachikonye L (2011), When a State turns on its citizens, Johannesburg, Jacana, Johannesburg

Tiruneh T. B. (2010), Establishing an Early Warning in the African Peace and Security Architecture, Challenges and Prospects, KAIPTC Occasional Paper No 29, September 2010

Tsvangirai M. (2011), Morgan Tsvangirai – At the deed end, Penguin Books, Johannesburg

White, G., 1994, 'Civil Society, Democratization and Development (I): Clearing the Analytical Ground', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3, pp. 375-90.

Whitefield T, (2010), Mediation in Practice Series: External Actors in mediation – dilemmas and options for mediators (HD Centre), Geneva

Wisler and Ateya (2007), Conflict Early Warning System for Sudan, Peace Research

Institute, University of Khartoum

Zenko, Micah and Friedman, Rebecca R.(2011) 'UN Early Warning for Preventing Conflict'.